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Abstract 
This research attempts to measure the impact ofmonopsony power on baseball 
players with less than six years of experience. Past research indicates that players with 
less than six years of experience have lower salaries than players with the same 
productivity and more than six years of experience. To try and combat monopsonistic 
behavior, baseball player's formed the Players' Union and instituted an arbitration 
process. Through this process, a third party arbitrator listens to cases from both a player 
and owner and then chooses either the player's or the owner's salary bid. While this 
process is intended to help players gain market power, it is still unclear whether the actual 
process is effective. Therefore, it is important to evaluate trends in players' salaries 
before, during, and after arbitration in order to see if further changes in the arbitration 
process need to be made. \ 
To do this, 19 outfielders who have filed for and received an arbitration hearing 
during the time frame of 1990-2003 are examined following their career throughout their 
pre-arbitration (first three years), arbitration year (after third year), and post-arbitration 
years (after fourth year on). By using the human capital model, three ratios of the 
players' actual salaries during these years to a predicted free agent salary are estimated. 
The prediction that the ratios should increase throughout these three periods, due to the 
fact that the players gain more market power, is supported by the results. In fact, the 
ratios of actual to predicted salary increase from 0.27 in pre-arbitration years, to 0.97 in 
the arbitration year, to over 1.2 in post-arbitration years. This indicates that the players 
face substantial monopsony power in the pre-arbitration year followed by a decrease in 
monopsony power through the arbitration process and post-arbitration years. 
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Introduction 
The arbitration process in baseball has had its share of controversy over the past twenty 
years. In fact, one of the main causes for the Players' Strike in 1994 was the player and owner 
disagreement surrounding the stipulations of arbitration (Faurot, 1992). While this process is in 
place to try to gain power back for players, a question of its effectiveness remains. 
When baseball players sign multimillion dollar contracts, the general public tends to 
question whether a single person is worth millions of dollars to simply playa game. Fortunately 
for baseball, statistics showing player's productivity are easy to measure and readily available. 
Therefore, economic analysis ofthe baseball market is possible. 
Baseball players do not just randomly receive high salaries. Owners receive revenue 
based on player's performances, and owners pay players based on these revenues. In economic 
terms, owners try to measure a player's marginal revenue product ofeach player before assessing 
a salary. 
\ 
In the baseball market, arbitration-eligibles and free agents try to attain salaries which 
reflect their MRP ofthe previous year. While free agents are free to sign with any team in the 
league, arbitration-eligibles must negotiate with their respective team. Therefore, all players in 
baseball are not in a truly competitive market (Marburger, 2004). 
In this paper, I hypothesize that the ratio of a players' actual salary to that of a predicted 
free agent salary increases over time finally approaching one. Furthermore, I believe that during 
a player's pre-arbitration years (prior to arbitration and free agency), a player will face substantial 
monopsonistic power and that the pre-arbitration player's salary will be substantially lower than 
the salary predicted by the free agent regression model. If the arbitration process is effective in 
combating owners' monopsony power, actual wages should be close to parity with predicted 
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wages. Furthermore, after arbitration, the player's salary should be equal to predicted salary 
since he is now participating in the competitive free agent market. Through this research I hope 
to measure the impact of monopsony power on baseball players' salaries prior to arbitration and 
during arbitration to gain a better understanding of the baseball market. 
Arbitration Process 
Before jumping into the literature and models ofbaseball, it is imperative to discuss the 
basic characteristics ofMajor League Baseball. Before baseball arbitration began in 1974, 
players were drafted onto a team and were not able to test their "market value" by negotiating 
contracts with other teams. Typically, one owner held the rights to a player and thus had 
monopsonistic power over him. Consequently, owners often paid players well below their 
marginal revenue products (Frederick, 1992). 
In response, players formed the MLB arbitration process in 1974 to try to gain market 
power back. Final-offer arbitration (FOA)~ as it is formally known, is set up to give players a 
chance to increase their salaries before they are able to file for free agency. During this process, 
both the player and his respective team submit their final offers between January 5 and January 
15 of each year. The hearings for the cases are then scheduled during the time period of 
February I and February 20. Before the hearings, players and owners are encouraged to 
continue negotiations. In fact, most players who file for arbitration do not make it to the actual 
arbitration hearing (Faurot, 1992). 
If the player and owner cannot reach an agreement, a third party arbitrator will be 
selected to the hearing. At this hearing, the player and owner are given one hour to present 
evidence and one-half hour to rebut the other side's case. Following the hearing, the arbitrator 
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has 24 hours to choose one offer, which will become the player's salary for the following season 
(Faurot, 1992). The criteria which arbitrators use to decide their judgments are: 
(1) The player's contribution during the past season, including overall performance and 
special qualities of leadership and public appeal; 
(2) Length and consistency ofcareer contribution; 
(3) The player's past compensation; 
(4) Comparative baseball salaries; 
(5) Recent club performance; and 
(6) Any physical or mental defects in the player. 
Arbitrators, however, are not permitted to decide their cases based upon: 
(1) Financial position ofplayer and club; 
(2) Press comments, testimonials, or similar material regarding player or club 
performance; 
(3) Offers made by either the player or the club prior to arbitration; 
\ 
(4) Expenditures of the player or club on agents, representatives, and so on; and 
(5) Salaries ofother sports or occupations. 
Also, arbitrators are not permitted to explain their choice of awards. They simply write the 
award into the Uniform Player's Contract. This indicates that the actual preferred award of the 
arbitrator is never revealed and must be inferred indirectly (Burgess, 2004). 
It is important to note that the selection of arbitrators is an important factor in arbitration 
behavior. Arbitrators are selected by both the players' union and the Player Relations 
Committee (representing the baseball clubs). Since their "models" for determining a winner is 
kept secret, arbitrators must neither favor players nor clubs. If arbitrators were to favor players 
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over clubs, for example, the Player Relations Committee would not select them the following 
year (Faurot, 1992). 
In fact, since the institution of this process, Dworkin (1981) indicates that the final results 
have been even. Of the cases which have been filed, the results are split between the players and 
the owners. This "indecision" regarding the decision of an arbitrator helps to push players and 
owners toward a negotiation rather than face a hearing (Faurot, 1992). It also suggests that the 
two extreme awards shown in the monopsony power model developed below are likely not to be 
realized since both parties realize that an arbitrator is unlikely to accept either an offer extremely 
favorable to owners or an offer extremely favorable to players. 
Review of Literature 
To be able to measure the impact of the arbitration process on player's salaries, it is first 
important to develop a model to measure player productivity. In The Value of Sports Talent, 
Rodney Fort (2003) concludes that a gener~l Marginal Revenue Product (MRP) model is ideal 
(Fort,2003). Under this theory, a player's salary can be determined based on productivity 
measures of a player (Fort, 2003). 
In baseball, different statistics are readily available to measure player productivity. 
Andrew Zimbalist (1992) argues that productivity (PROD), also known as OPS (on-base 
percentage plus slugging percentage), which adds a player's on-base percentage ((hits + walks + 
hit by pitches)/ (at bats +walks + sacrifices + hit by pitches)) and slugging percentage (total 
bases/at bats), is the best measure of a hitter's productivity. At the time, Slugging Percentage 
was generally used to measure player productivity. However, Zimbalist believes that while 
Slugging Percentage "is a good indicator of offensive performance, it excludes one major 
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component of offensive contribution, walks" (Zimbalist, 1992). Therefore, OPS should be used 
because it not only takes into account power statistics, but also walks. 
Alan Schwarz (2004) agrees with Zimbalist that OPS is the best statistic to measure a 
hitter's productivity. As Schwarz explains, this statistic "measures the key areas of offensive 
production: getting on base and advancing runners" (Schwarz, 2004). As he further explains in 
his article, looking at just SLG without OBP "is like subsisting on food without water" (Schwarz, 
2004) because both are necessary. 
Phillip Miller (2000) conducts both a theoretical and empirical comparison ofnegotiated 
salaries detennined in baseball's free agent system to those detennined in its final-offer 
arbitration system. In this model, Miller attempts to predict the salary of a player based on 
specific productivity measures. Some of these productivity measures range from a Runs Created 
(RC) variable, which is detennined by (Hits + Walks)*(Total Bases)/(Plate Appearances), to runs 
a player saves defensively. In his results, Miller concludes that an offensive productivity 
measure, RC, is significant, while the defensive productivity measures are not (Miller, 2000).
\ 
Miller also concludes that there is a difference in the salary structure for arbitration 
eligibles and free agent players (Miller, 2000). While he finds out that there is a significant 
positive relationship between the salaries of free agents directly affecting the negotiated salaries 
of arbitration eligibles, Miller concludes that the systems do not detennine equal salaries for 
players with the same MRP (Miller, 2000). 
Marburger (1996) uses MRP models to test salary with respect to years of experience. In 
his study, he concludes that experience is in fact significant when detennining a player's salary 
(Marburger, 1996). Furthennore, he concludes that players with more than six years of 
experience, thus able to freely sign with any team, are subject to salaries closest to their marginal 
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revenue products. This supports the notion that the arbitration process does not fully eliminate 
monopsonistic behavior. 
Theoretical Framework 
This study makes use of the human capital theory, which states that players should be 
compensated based on certain productivity measures. Since productivity is possible to measure 
in baseball, this theory is applicable for this research. Salary is therefore determined by certain 
productivity measures. 
This research also makes use of a modified version of the monopsony model. This model 
is shown below: 
Figure 1:
 
Monopsony Model
 
wage, 
MFC 
MRP
 
quantity of labor 
In this market, there are several sellers of service (pre-free-agency players), but there is 
only one buyer (an owner). Therefore the firm faces a monopsonistic market for labor, but it is a 
unique monopsonistic market. Since workers differ in both abilities and in terms of opportunity 
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costs, each player will have a unique MRP and a unique reservation wage. Since each player has 
unique characteristics and since some players can negotiate their individual wages with the firm, 
the traditional monopsonistic view of the marginal cost of labor curve no longer holds. Instead, 
we can only identify a range within which the wage settlement will occur for each player 
Suppose that the team ranks players from most productive to least productive. The 
potential marginal revenue product is given by MRP in figure 1. If the roster is Lo number of 
players, Figure 1 shows that player Lo has a reservation wage ofwo and a MRP ofw*. 
Therefore, if player Lo goes to arbitration, the two wages submitted to the arbitrator would be 
bounded by the two constraints ofthe monopsony model: w* and woo In the pre-arbitration 
years, a player's wage would be wo because he does not have market power, and the owner 
would pay only enough to ensure that the player does not exit the market. Through the 
arbitration process, the wage moves closer to w*, but does not reach it. If arbitrators have evenly 
dispersed the number ofwinners between owners and players and do not generally accept 
"extreme" proposals, the "average" wage w~uld fall between these two constraints. Therefore, 
arbitration eligibles still face monopsonistic power because their actual wage is less than their 
MRP. However, the players do face less monopsonistic power in their arbitration year than pre­
arbitration years. 
Data 
This model uses strictly outfielders because these individuals generally have the highest 
offensive production numbers. Consequently, their salaries generally reflect offensive 
production. The sample consists of 19 outfielders who applied for and received a hearing in the 
arbitration process. By following their salary and production changes throughout their respective 
Tannan 8 
careers, each "phase" of their career can be represented. Table 1 lists the variables and 
descriptive statistics for these players: 
Table 1: Variables and Descriptions (Free Agents)
 
Predicted 
Sign Statistic Name Definition Mean Max Min Std. Dev. 
Dependent 
Variable 
SAL Salary Value of Contract $5,691,372 $26,700,038 $284,893 $6,396,355 
+ 
+ 
Independent 
Variable 
GP 
OPS (PROD) 
Games Played 
OPS (PROD) 
Games Played 
before contract 
was awarded 
Slugging % + 
On-base % 
115 
753 
163 
1800 
2 
0 
43 
154 
Source: Baseballreference.com 
For each player, offensive statistics as well as games played from the year prior to 
signing a new contract or filing for arbitration are used. For example, if a player signed a new 
contract in 1992, the offensive statistics from 1991 are used. These statistics are used because 
owners will use previous offensive productivity measures to determine the value of each player. 
Also, the salaries are computed into 2003 dollar figures using a baseball wage index. This index 
is computed using the average salaries for baseball players in each year using 2004 as the base 
year. Therefore, all dollar values should be interpreted in 2004 baseball dollar figures. 
These statistics can be found on www.baseballreference.com or www.espn.com. To find 
data for players who have filed for either arbitration or free agency, www.roadsideohotos.comis 
an excellent site and was used for this study. This website offers a complete list of players filing 
for free agency and arbitration as well as the year in which this was done. 
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Empirical Framework 
This study researches and measures the impact ofmonopsony power on baseball players 
over the course of their career. To do this, three ratios are constructed measuring actual salary to 
a predicted free agent salary. By doing so, the ratio explains how close the player's actual salary, 
most notably in pre-arbitration and arbitration years, is to an estimated salary the player would 
have received via free agency. 
The first step in this research is to develop a model which can predict free agent salary 
based on productivity measures. Based on my previous research which used 228 outfielders who 
were granted free agency and signed a new contract between 1990 and 2003, a model to predict 
salary has been developed. Equation 1 shows this model: 
This regression assumes that salary is determined through basic human capital theory. To 
determine the productivity measures OPS and GP, different offensive and defensive productivity 
measures are included in the model. However, only OPS and GP are statistically significant. 
\ 
Furthermore, defensive statistics are removed from the model because of their ambiguity. As 
Miller indicates, the faster players could be penalized because they run to a ball and drop it, 
whereas a slower player would not get to the ball and would let it bounce and not be charged an 
error (Miller, 2000). 
However, improvements to the above model are necessary because the focus of this paper 
is not geared to find the best productivity measures themselves, but instead to obtain the best 
prediction of what players would make in a free agency market. One such improvement deals 
with the constant of the equation. Intuitively, it makes sense that a player should not make 
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money ifhe is not productive. Also, it is intuitive that negative salaries should not be a likely 
prediction. Therefore, the constant term is constrained to the origin. 
Another improvement deals with the actual data itself. Since baseball has been growing 
more rapidly in terms of inflation over the past 15 years, an inflationary baseball index using 
average baseball salaries for each year will give a more accurate depiction of the baseball 
salaries than the CPI index. Therefore, all salaries are in 2004 baseball dollar figures. 
With these improvements, the equation for the predicted free agent salary is expressed in 
Equation 2: 
SAL = 0\ OPS + 02 GP + E (2) 
Note that while the constant is removed, the equation still uses the same productivity measures as 
the previous research. 
Results 
The results from the two regression ~quations are found in Table 2. Equation 1 includes 
the constant term and Equation 2 suppresses the constant to zero: 
Table 2: Regression Results 
Dependent Variable 
Statistic 
SAL 
Independent Variables 
Statistic 
Constant 
Games Played 
OPS 
Equation 1 Equation 2 
Coefficients 
-18,746,990 
75,728 
19,896 
Coefficients 
0 
52,996 
-386 
R Square 0.403 0.254 
Sample Size 228 228 
Source: The Author 
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By removing the constant from the equation, the R Squared value decreases from .403 to .254. 
While the R-squared value for the model does decrease, the overall predictions are improved. 
There are zero negative salary predictions indicating that the lower bound of the salary 
predictions is improved. (Note that to make the R Squared value for Equation 2 comparable to 
the R Squared value for Equation 1, a Pearson correlation test between the unstandardized 
predicted values for salary and the actual salary was calculated and squared.) 
To obtain the results for the ratios, a ratio representing a player's actual salary divided by 
the salary that was estimated using a sample of228 outfielders is constructed. For example, the 
pre-arbitration ratio represents the player's actual salary divided by the predicted free agent 
salary estimate. These estimates are reported in Table 2. The estimated salary for each of the 19 
players who went through arbitration is determined for each year by using the regression 
obtained in Equation 2. Then the average of all 19 players' pre-arbitration years is determined to 
obtain the pre-arbitration ratio. The same format is used for the arbitration ratio and post­
\ 
arbitration ratio. The players' actual salary divided by the salary that was estimated in Equation 
2 is conducted for the given timeframe. The results for the pre-arbitration, arbitration, and post-
arbitration ratios are listed in Table 3. 
Table 3: Ratios Results 
All Arbitration Players Arbitration Players (minus outliers) 
Pre-Arbitration 0.2711 0.2603 
Arbitration 0.9660 0.9004 
Post-Arbitration 1.2857 0.9627 
Source: The Author 
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The first set ofratios (all arbitration players) indicates that prior to arbitration, players face 
significant monopsonistic exploitation. In fact, the arbitration players who received a hearing 
since 1990 received only 27% of what they could have made via free agency. During the 
arbitration year, a player is able to gain significant power back, but not completely. This is to be 
expected, as they are able to negotiate a new contract, but only with their own ball club. It is 
important, however, to note that the arbitration ratios are not statistically significant from one, 
yet they are statistically different from the post-arbitration ratio. 
While the first two ratios seem to line up with theory, the post-arbitration ratio of 1.29 is 
unexpected. This indicates that these players' actual salary is 1.29 times a predicted free agent 
salary. To try to explain this phenomenon, the second set of ratios is offered. These ratios 
follow the same format, actual salary to predicted free agent salary, but leave out players who 
have post-arbitration ratios above 2.5. These players, which include Bernie Williams, Barry 
Bonds, and Bobby Bonilla, receive salaries well above a predicted free agent salary. This may 
be due to the fact that these players have sQme sort of "star power" which may lead to higher 
salaries. These higher salaries may be justified because "stars" attract more fans and more fans 
mean higher MRP. Thus, a variable that may be omitted from the estimation is some sort of 
proxy for star power. This might be a fruitful area for future research. 
When leaving these players out of the arbitration player ratios, the results improve. As 
shown in Table 3, the ratios increase from 0.26 to 0.90 to 0.96. As hypothesized, the ratios for 
these three periods increase over time and approach one. 
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Conclusion 
The results of the ratios indicate that players face substantial monopsonistic power early 
in their career, and only gain market power back through the arbitration process and free agency. 
This research takes Marburger (1996) and Miller's (2000) works one step further as it digs 
deeper into the pre-arbitration years ofplayers. By providing meaningful ratios, the actual 
monopsonistic power of owners is shown. As Table 3 indicates, players in the pre-arbitration 
stage of their career receive only 27% of the salary they could receive via free agency. The 
arbitration process, however, allows players to gain some market power back, but also allows the 
owners to retain some monopsonistic power. As Faurot points out, this is expected because the 
terms for the arbitration process are negotiated by both the players' union and the Player 
Relations Committee. 
In this research the concept that some players are paid well above their productivity 
contributions to their respective team is developed. It appears that some sort of "star power" is 
assigned to these players, which enables them to receive salaries based on characteristics other
\ 
than the measures ofproductivity used in this study. Future research could look into the star 
power issue to find a way to measure this effect. Regression analysis may be able to find certain 
characteristics such as home runs per year, MVP awards, endorsement deals, rookie card value, 
an experience factor, etc. If a certain star power measure is found, the addition of that unit to this 
research's equation would be beneficial. 
Future research could also explore the effects of the arbitration process on a player's 
salary at all positions. Developing a free agent model for pitchers, for example, may help to 
show whether these players face the same type ofmonopsonistic behavior as outfielders. If a 
Tarman 14 
model were constructed for all position players, it may help players decided which positions are 
the most beneficial early in their careers. 
\ 
•
 
Tarman 15 
Works Cited 
Baseball-Reference.com. 7 October 2004 < http://baseballreference.com/>. 
Burgess, Paul, and Daniel Marburger. "Can Prior Offers and Arbitration Outcomes be 
used to predict the Winners of Subsequent Final-Offer Arbitration Cases?" Southern 
Economics Journal. July 2004: 93-102. 
Dworkin, James B. Owners Versus Players. Boston: Auburn House Publishing 
Company, 1981. 
ESPN.com. 2004. ESPN, Inc. 7 October 2004 <http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/players>. 
Faurot, David J., and Stephen McAllister. "Salary Arbitration and Pre-Arbitration 
Negotiation in Major League Baseball." Industrial & Labor Relations Review. July 
1992: 697-710. 
Fort, Rodney D. "The Value of Sports Talent." Sports Economics. New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, 2003: 177-224. 
Frederick, David, William Kaempfer, and Richard Woobbekind. "Salary Arbitration 
as a Market Substitute." Diamonds Are Forever. Ed. Paul Sommers. Washington D. C.: 
Brookings Institution, 1992: 29-49. 
Marburger, Daniel R. "A Comparison of Salary Determination in the Free Agent and 
Salary Arbitration Markets." Baseball Economics: Current Research. Ed. John Fizel, 
Elizabeth Gustafson, and Lawrence Hadley. London: Praeger Publishers, 1996: 67-76. 
Marburger, Daniel R. "Arbitrator Compromise in Final Offer Arbitration: Evidence from 
Major League Baseball." Economic Inquiry. 2004: 60-68. 
Miller, Phillip A. "A Theoretical and Empirical Comparison of Free Agent and 
Aribtration-Eligible Salaries Negotiated in Major League Baseball." Southern Economic 
Journal. July 2000: 87-104. 
Schwarz, Alan. "WHIP It Good...Statistically." ESPN.com. 21 January 2004. 
<http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/columns/story?columnist=Schwarz alan&ID=1713520>. 
Zimbalist, Andrew. "Salaries and Performance: Beyond the Scully Model." Diamonds 
Are Forever. Ed. Paul Sommers. Washington D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1992: 109­
133. 
